Definition and division of concepts had their place in the textbooks of the time, in Meier, and in Kant's lectures in the chapter on concept in the doctrine of elements. Even logical problems belonging to the highest level of the architectonic analyzed in the book are not mentioned. Why is it, for instance, that the copulative judgment, and with it conjunction, present in the logical textbooks of the time, in Meier, and in Kant's reflections, vanishes somewhere in the development leading to the first Cr/t/que and the Jaesche Logic? Was it dropped only because there was no place for it in the construction of a balanced architectonic of the table of judgments? Is this another of the surprising movements in Kant's logic, like the move from the disjunctive judgment to the category of reciprocal causation? A student of logic knows that the biconditional is the natural logical counterpart of reciprocal causality, but also that the biconditional is precisely the negation of strict disjunction. Questions about the substructures of the architectonic are never mentioned.
Conrad's book deals only with the architectonic of the first Cr/t/que and its roots in Kant's conception of formal logic on the highest level of generality. It is only a canon, a negative criterion of truth. In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:īOOK REVIEWS 621 can be already found in his lectures: dialectic in formal logic leads to the illusions of sophistry.
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